

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
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MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI (105-216642)

DATE: 5/24/72

FROM : SAC, WFO (105-106153)(P)

SUBJECT: OLEG A. LYALIN
ESP - R

Re WFO let & blind memo, 5/9/72, captioned "GOLDFINCH/
[redacted] containing questions for [redacted]
and Bu routing slip, 5/19/72, instructing WFO to resubmit in
LHM form.

In compliance with Bureau instructions, enclosed are
5 copies for Bureau and 1 each for information of Chicago,
New York and San Francisco of LHM captioned "GOLDFINCH"
[redacted] containing suggested questions for
GOLDFINCH.

The LHM has been classified "~~Secret~~" since it
contains information from [redacted] so classified.

The Bureau is requested to furnish a copy of the
LHM to [redacted]

- 3 - Bureau (Enc. 5)
(1 - Legat, London)
1 - Chicago (Info)(Enc. 1)
1 - New York (Info)(Enc. 1)
1 - San Francisco (Info)(Enc. 1)
1 - WFO

JPW:jw
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REC-26

105-216642-64

MAY 31 1972

ESPIONAGE



54 JUN 13 1972

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

EXP. PROC.

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Copy to [redacted] (see)
by routing slip for
☒ info ☐ action
date 5-31-72
by [redacted]



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Washington, D. C. 20535
May 24, 1972

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

~~SECRET~~

GOLDFINCH [REDACTED]

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Reference is made to memorandum dated 27 March 1972
pertaining in part to [REDACTED]
identified by GOLDFINCH [REDACTED]
the KGB (Soviet Committee for State Security) School 101 in
which GOLDFINCH studied from August, 1960 until October, 1961.

U.S.A. U.S.S.R.

According to GOLDFINCH, [REDACTED]

KGB

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[REDACTED]
GOLDFINCH also recalled that while he was at the KGB 101 School,
[REDACTED] based on experience in the United
States, [REDACTED] Also, [REDACTED]
GOLDFINCH [REDACTED]

In view of the information furnished by GOLDFINCH that
during the period 1960-1961 when [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]
in the United States, it is requested that GOLDFINCH be asked if
he thinks [REDACTED] in the United States
[REDACTED] and if so, during what period and under what
circumstances? For example, does GOLDFINCH think [REDACTED]
was with him, and, if so, [REDACTED]

In regard to the man [REDACTED] mentioned who was a

[REDACTED] it is requested
that GOLDFINCH be asked if he thinks this individual was an

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105-216642-64
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

ENCLOSURE

~~SECRET~~

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GOLDFINCH [REDACTED]

Washington, D.C.? Did [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

It is noted that among the KGB [REDACTED]
has identified who were in the United States in early 1964 are:

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[REDACTED]

the FBI. It is the property of
the FBI and is loaned to your agency.
It and its contents are not to be
distributed outside your agency.

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~~SECRET~~

FBI

Date. 5/25/72

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL _____
(Priority)

TO: ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI (65-74228)

FROM: SAC, BOSTON (65-5256) (P)

SUBJECT:

OO:BS

OLEG LYALIN

Re Boston airtel and LHM dated 1/3/72, Boston letter to the Bureau dated 3/21/72, and Bureau letter to Boston dated 4/17/72. No copies of re letters were designated for the New York Office.

Enclosed for the Bureau are 10 copies of an LHM dated as above and captioned . A single information copy of the LHM is being disseminated for the New York Office.
designated 0

The Bureau is requested to furnish appropriate copies of the LHM to Legat, London for transmittal to

A copy of the LHM is being disseminated to the Boston Office of INS.

The LHM is classified "~~Confidential~~" since it discloses the Bureau's investigative interests in official

/ ENCLOSURE

- ③ Bureau (Encs. 10) (RM)
1 105- (OLEG LYALIN)
1 New York (Enc. 1) (65-25699) (info) (RM)
3 Boston
1 105-19316 (OLEG LYALIN)

JEM:ram
(7)

105-216642-
NOT RECORDED
26 JUN 1 1972

Approved: F75
70 JUN 8 1972 Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

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ORIGINAL FILED IN 105-216642-59

BS 65-5256

representatives of a foreign country, the unauthorized disclosure of which could conceivably prove to be prejudicial to the defense interests of the United States.

The Boston Office will promptly furnish the Bureau and interested offices in appropriate form any additional information that subject might volunteer, it being noted that during interview on 5/23/72, subject indicated that he would continue to reflect [redacted] [redacted] England in which [redacted] displayed an interest.

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The Boston Office will also await any additional requests by [redacted] concerning the necessity of further inquiries of the subject.

b7D



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Boston, Massachusetts

May 25, 1972



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Reference is made to memorandum dated January 3, 1972
at Boston, Massachusetts.

This document contains neither recommendations nor
conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and
is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to
be distributed outside your agency.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

105-216642-

ENCLOSURE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

CONFIDENTIALDate of transcription 5/25/72

1.

[redacted] and Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) discussed disclosures previously made by [redacted] to the FBI concerning his involvement with Soviet intelligence in London, England prior to his arrival in the United States during September, 1970. Prior to this discussion, [redacted] was advised by Special Agent JOHN E. MULVANEY of his rights as contained in an executed "Interrogation; Advice of Rights" form.

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Also discussed was the contents of news articles that appeared in the February 9, 1972 issues of the London newspapers, the "Daily Telegraph" and "Daily Mail", which recounted the details relating to SIRAJ ABDOLCADER's involvement with a Soviet intelligence operation in London which was brought to the attention of British authorities during September, 1971 by a Soviet defector, OLEG LYALIN.

Following the above discussion [redacted] reaffirmed that he possessed no information concerning his past involvement with Soviet intelligence in addition to that made available by him to the FBI during previous interviews. He again steadfastly denied that his motive in cooperating with the Soviets was mercenary in nature.

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The discussion also included a reference to information provided by [redacted] during interview on December 28, 1971 relating to a desire by [redacted]

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England, [redacted]

Interviewed on 5/23/72 at [redacted] Massachusetts# BS 65-5256

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SAs JOHN E. MULVANEY and

by [redacted] JEM:mm Date dictated 5/25/72

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2.
BS 65-5256

In an effort to obtain additional identifying data

[redacted]
[redacted] a Rand Mc Nally "Road Atlas of Europe" depicting
[redacted] London

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[redacted] London [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

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b7C

[redacted]

b6
b7C

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3.

BS 65-5256

[REDACTED]

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b7C

[REDACTED]

b6
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6
b7C

[REDACTED]

b6
b7C

[REDACTED] such as a store or pub and noted very little activity on the part of the inhabitants. He attributed this situation to the fact that many of the inhabitants were absent from their homes and spending the day elsewhere.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4.
BS 65-5256

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[redacted] stated that the following English villages are unfamiliar to him:

Avebury

Queensford

Beckhampton

Studley

Yatesbury

Corsham

Cherhill

Lower Pickwick

Box

In furnishing the above information [redacted] considered the possibility that there are slight inaccuracies with respect to his description of the above area which he visited and attributed this possibility to a poor memory. He indicated that he will continuously reflect on the above matter in the hope that he can recall additional descriptive data, particularly the name of [redacted]

b6
b7C

[redacted] concluded by stating that he would notify the FBI in the event additional pertinent information comes to his attention.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

1 - Mr. Lee

May 26, 1972

16434

RE: GOLDFINCH

Reference is made to your memorandum dated May 23, 1972, your reference PF 884.

Information was received several years ago that the 13th Department of the KGB had been redesignated Department "V."

EX-115 1 - London → By O-7, 5-26-72 *cg*
Delivered to Washington Representative of [] on 5-26-72
by *cg*.

b7D

REC-70

105-216642-65

1 - []
1 - Foreign Liaison Desk

APL:tdp (7) *tdp*

NOTE: Goldfinch is [] code name for Oleg Lyalin, KGB defector. He had furnished information concerning the redesignation of the 13th Dept. of the KGB as Department "V." [] wished to know whether we were previously aware of such redesignation. [] had so advised us. Classified "SECRET" to conform with [] classification of information from the Goldfinch source.

SECRET

60 JUN 8/12 1972

MAY 28 15 42 PM '72

FBI-7021ICE
REC'D E-3 HITLER

EM/1064

APL

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 105-216642-65

MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI (105-216642)

DATE: 6/14/72

FROM : SAC, WFO (105-106153) (P)

SUBJECT: OLEG A. LYALIN
ESP - R

Re WFO letter and LHM, 5/24/72, captioned "GOLDFINCH/

[redacted] containing questions for [redacted]
Bureau routing slip, 6/12/72, GOLDFINCH caption, enclosing
[redacted] memorandum, 6/2/72: and WFO letter and LHM, 11/12/69.
captioned [redacted]

[redacted] reporting identification by [redacted]

Enclosed are five copies for the Bureau and one for
information of New York of LHM captioned "GOLDFINCH" [redacted]

Also enclosed for the
Bureau is a photograph of [redacted]

The LHM has been classified "~~Secret~~" since [redacted]
has requested that information from [redacted] be so classified.
It is suggested that the Bureau furnish a copy of the enclosed
LHM to [redacted]

Copy to 2cc LHM + loc photo to
by routing slip for
☒ info ☐ action
date 6/21/72
by JPL/clc
1-1 820

ENCLOSURE

- ③- Bureau (Enc. 6)
(1- Legat, London)
1- New York (Info) (Enc. 1)
3- WFO
(1- [redacted])
(1- [redacted])

JPW:ss
(7) 53 JUN 29 1972

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

REC-37

105-216642-68

15 JUN 15 1972

EX-109

JUN 28 1972

ESPIONAGE

EXP. PROC.

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

b6
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b7D

b6
b7C
b7D
b7E

b6
b7C
b7D



~~SECRET~~ (U)

1 - Mr. Lee

(E) 105-216642

BY COURIER

Date: June 30, 1972

To: Director

Attention: [REDACTED]

From: L. Patrick Gray, III, Acting Director

Subject: OLEG LYALIN
ESPIONAGE - RUSSIA

There are attached one copy of a memorandum prepared by this Bureau captioned "Goldfinch" dated February 9, 1972, which sets forth questions arising from a paper prepared by Oleg Lyalin entitled "Some Problems of Ensuring Counterintelligence Requirements in Baltic Ports" and one copy of an undated memorandum captioned "The K.G.B. in Lithuania," which was furnished to this Bureau by [REDACTED] by memorandum dated June 20, 1972. These items are furnished to you inasmuch as [REDACTED] and this Bureau thought you would be interested in this information given by Lyalin.

Enclosures - 2

- 1 - WFO (Enclosures - 2)
- 1 - New York (Enclosures - 2)
- 1 - San Francisco (Enclosures - 2)
- 1 - Chicago (Enclosures - 2)

NOTE FOR SACS, WFO, NY, SF, AND CG:

The same attachments referred to in the letter to [REDACTED] are also attached for the information of each office.

JPL:tdp
(8)

MAILED 4
JUN 30 1972
FBI
Felt _____
Mohr _____
Rosen _____
Bates _____
Bishop _____
Callahan _____
Campbell _____
Casper _____
Cleveland _____
Conrad _____
Dalbey _____
Marshall _____
Miller, E.S. _____
Ponder _____
Soyars _____
Walters _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Kinley _____
Mr. Armstrong _____
Ms. Herwig _____
Mrs. Neenan _____

MAIL ROOM ☐

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

~~SECRET~~ (U)

Group 1

Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

REC-37 105-216642-70
SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

19 JUL 3 1972

JUL 10 1972

PM/DA 592

~~SECRET~~

(U)

Director

[REDACTED]

b7D

b7E

NOTE:

Classified "~~SECRET~~" since [REDACTED] has classified the information furnished by Lyalin with that classification. [REDACTED] had originally furnished the Bureau with a paper prepared by Lyalin and WFO had prepared a memorandum setting forth questions to be asked of Lyalin concerning his paper. [REDACTED] by letter of 6/20/72, furnished a memorandum responsive to these questions and [REDACTED] noted that it was furnishing an extra copy in the event we desire to furnish same to [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

(U)

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI (105-216642)

DATE: 7/26/72

FROM : SAC, WFO (105-106153) (P)

SUBJECT: OLEG A. LYALIN
IS - R

ReBu routing slip, 7/10/72, enclosing communication of 6/21/72 concerning State Scientific and Technical Committee (GNTK) and requesting comments of recipient offices.

Enclosed are five copies for the Bureau and one each for information of Chicago, New York and San Francisco of LHM captioned, "ALL UNION CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF USSR" reporting information from [redacted]

The LHM is classified "~~Secret~~" since [redacted] has requested that information from this source be so classified.

It is suggested that the Bureau consider the desirability of disseminating the enclosed LHM to [redacted]

- 2 - Bureau (5 Enc)
1 - Chicago (Info) (1 Enc)
1 - New York (Info) (1 Enc)
1 - San Francisco (Info) (1 Enc)
1 - WFO

JPW:teb
(6)

REC 43
ST-116

105-216642-75

60 OCT 24 1972

4 JUL 28 1972





UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Washington, D. C. 20535
July 26, 1972

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

~~SECRET~~ (U)

ALL UNION CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF USSR

Reference is made to memorandum enclosed in communication dated June 21, 1972, captioned, "STATE SCIENTIFIC & TECHNICAL COMMITTEE" (GNTK), describing the role GNTK now appears to be playing in trade negotiations with the United Kingdom.

Although not specifically applicable to GNTK, [redacted]

Second Chief

Directorate (SCD), KGB, has furnished comments concerning the role KGB appears to be playing in the All Union Chamber of Commerce (AUCC) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). [redacted] noted that the July 21, 1970, issue of the Soviet publication "Pravda" contains an article indicating that E. P. Pitovranov is Acting Chairman of the AUCC, and that the January 21, 1971, issue of "Pravda" contains a letter from Pitovranov of AUCC which refers to something like 87 exhibitions in the USSR. He expressed the opinion that E. P. Pitovranov is identical with Yevgeniy (Evgeniy) Petrovich Pitovranov who in 1964 was a General in KGB. He noted that Pitovranov would now be approaching the age of retirement from KGB, but stated the position of Acting Chairman of AUCC would represent entirely too high a position for a retiring KGB officer to obtain, even a KGB officer with the rank of General.

[redacted] also expressed the opinion that [redacted]

Chief of the International and Foreign

EXHIBITS OF AUCC, [redacted]

[redacted] Deputy Chief of the old 13th Department, First Chief Directorate, KGB.

[redacted] expressed the opinion that KGB has an important operative group in the AUCC, [redacted] and that KGB feels that AUCC represents a fertile field for

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

ENCLOSURE

~~SECRET~~ (U)

~~SECRET~~ (U)

RE: ALL UNION CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE OF USSR

intelligence and counterintelligence operations, such as
the recruitment of foreign agents. [REDACTED]

b6
b7C

[REDACTED]
such as AUCC. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

This document contains neither
recommendations nor conclusions of
the FBI. It is the property of
the FBI and is loaned to your agency;
it and its contents are not to be
distributed outside your agency.

~~SECRET~~ (U)

MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI (105-216642) DATE: 7/28/72

FROM : *RE: SAC* SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (65-6083) (RUC)

SUBJECT: OLEG A. LYALIN
IS - R

W/d
25

☐ Re Bureau routing slip dated 7/10/72 enclosing a memorandum dated 6/21/72 relating to the role that GNTK (State Scientific and Technical Committee) plays in trade negotiations with the United Kingdom. Bureau requested the comments of this office regarding the above referenced observations of ☐

San Francisco
7/28/72

San Francisco has reviewed the above material as well as the original data relating to this topic that was provided by Goldfinch and set forth in a paper dated 12/71 entitled "Organization of the Soviet Committee of State Security," (Section III, Paragraph 51). This office is not in possession of any direct evidence to support the observations of ☐ It is noted, however, that the comments of Goldfinch relative to the use of GNTK for cover positions by the KGB is but a reiteration of the data from other Soviet defectors over the past ten years and supports this fact.

It is felt that it would only be logical for the KGB to exert influence within GNTK to the extent necessary that would enable it (KGB) to carry out its intelligence objectives. Of course, this would be dependent upon the existing "political climate" within the Soviet government at any given time.

It is, therefore, believed that the comments of ☐ are valid.

2 - Bureau (RM)
1 - San Francisco
JFM/cmp
(3)

REC-58

105-216642-76
JUL 31 1972

ESPIONAGE



5010-108-02

137
20 OCT 20 1972
Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI (105-216642)

DATE: 8/17/72

FROM : SAC, WFO (105-106153) (P)

SUBJECT: OLEG A. LYALIN
IS - R

Re Bureau routing slip, 8/4/72, enclosing []
communication dated 7/31/72 which solicited FBI comments.

Enclosed are five copies for Bureau and one each
for information of Chicago, New York, and San Francisco of
LHM captioned "GOLDFINCH" which contains information con-
cerning a Lithuanian traveling with a Soviet group visiting
the United States during 1961-1962 who was used by KGB.

The LHM is classified "~~Secret~~" since it contains
information from [] so classified.

It is suggested that the Bureau disseminate a
copy of the enclosed LHM to []

EX-104

REC 43

105-216642-79

23 AUG 18 1972

ENCLOSURE

- 2- Bureau (Enc. 5)
- 1- Chicago (Info) (Enc. 1)
- 1- New York (Info) (Enc. 1)
- 1- San Francisco (Info) (Enc. 1)
- 1- WFO

JPW:ss
(6)

ESPIONAGE



6 AUG 24 1972

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Washington, D. C. 20535
August 17, 1972

~~SECRET~~

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

~~GOLDFINCH~~

NO LOR

Russ
Reference is made to communication of July 31, 1972, containing in part information concerning the visit to the United States of the Rector or Dean of the Klaipeda Branch of the Kaunas Polytechnic Institute.

In an effort to identify this individual, [redacted] Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB), [redacted] it is requested that the source be asked if he has any knowledge of the type of Lithuanian delegation which visited the United States in 1961-1962. For example, was it a group of Lithuanian educators, or possibly some type of maritime group, since [redacted] Director of Interclub, the International Seaman's Club, or was it some type of miscellaneous tourist group composed of individuals with unrelated backgrounds and professions? Does source have any knowledge of the size of the group or the duration of its stay in the United States? Also, did a KGB security officer accompany the group, and, if so, was he from the Lithuanian KGB or from the First Chief Directorate or Second Chief Directorate in Moscow? If a KGB security officer was with the group, [redacted]

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Was the Lithuanian delegation a part of some type of East-West Exchange arrangement under which American groups reciprocate by visiting the Soviet Union, and, if so, did the reciprocal American group visit Lithuania?

This document contains neither
recommendations nor conclusions of
the FBI. It is the property of
the FBI and is loaned to your agency;
it and its contents are not to be
distributed outside your agency.

105-216642-79
~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

ENCLOSURE

GOVERNMENT

~~SECRET~~ (U)

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC
DECLASSIFICATION
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
EXEMPTION CODE: 50X(1 HUM)
DATE 07-15-2015
C32W33B91

Memorandum

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI (105-212804) DATE:

AUG 4 1972

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (105-114120) (P)

SUBJECT:

[REDACTED]

IS-R

Enclosed herewith are ten copies of an LHM, dated and captioned as above. The LHM is classified "~~Secret~~" in view of the fact that it contains information relative to a double agent operation, the disclosure of which would cause serious damage to the defense interests of the US. Also enclosed for the facility of [REDACTED] are photo marks of [REDACTED]

The Bureau and Legat, London's attention is directed to previous communications in this matter [REDACTED] in the [REDACTED] caption.

NY Tel in this matter [REDACTED]

as recently as the last week in July concerning the above-captioned subjects.

The only positive information [REDACTED] from either of the [REDACTED]

ENCLOSURE

8 - Bureau (Encls. 12) (RM)
(4 - Legat, London) (105-4945)
(105-4946)
(105-216642) (TYATTW)

1 - New York (105-115626) (TYATTW) (S)

1 - New York (S)

RFM:dje

(11)

60 AUG 17 1972

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

~~SECRET~~ (U)

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b6
b7C
b7D

b1
b6
b3
b7C

b1
b3

b1
b3

b6
b7C

NOT RECORDED
28 AUG 14 1972

b1
b3

ORIGINAL FILED IN 105-212804-7

NY 105-114120.

(S)

It is not felt that [] can logically push any further without creating undue suspicion on the part of the [] concerning him or his suspicions of them.

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In view of the foregoing, the NYO would request that the photographs and the general background be again furnished to [] for their display to GOLDFINCH. Initially, it was deemed that GOLDFINCH because of his own assignments would not be able to furnish information concerning illegal operations; however, GOLDFINCH has furnished a great deal concerning illegal operations regarding the US. It is therefore possible that with a review of the material and the furnishing of the photographs, GOLDFINCH would be able to possibly identify or furnish some information concerning these individuals.

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(S)

The manner as has been previously set forth as to [] is circumspect and []

b1

b3

It is therefore requested that [] be furnished to [] requesting photographs and background situation be furnished to GOLDFINCH for any knowledge that he might have concerning these individuals.

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~~SECRET~~



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
New York, New York

AUG 4 1972

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.



b6
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
NY T-1, who has furnished reliable information
in the past, has advised that [redacted] still resides
in the United States [redacted]

b6
b7C



NY T-1, who is knowledgeable in certain areas
of [redacted] considers the background of both
[redacted] highly circumspect in view of the
manner in which [redacted]

b6
b7C



United States.

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
Declassification

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS NEITHER
RECOMMENDATIONS NOR CONCLUSIONS
OF THE FBI. IT IS THE PROPERTY
OF THE FBI AND IS LOANED TO YOUR
AGENCY; IT AND ITS CONTENTS ARE
NOT TO BE DISTRIBUTED OUTSIDE
YOUR AGENCY.

- 1* -



105-216642-

ENCLOSURE

~~SECRET~~



b6
b7C

1. It is requested that photographs of both 
 be displayed to the source for any knowledge he might have concerning them.
2. If desired, it is permissible to furnish detailed background concerning each of these individuals to the source for his knowledge of any couple such as this being dispatched to the United States as Illegal operatives even though they possibly were third country nationals.

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI (105-216642)

DATE: 9/5/72

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (105-115626) (P)

SUBJECT: OLEG A. LYALIN
IS - R

ReNYlet 8/18/72 captioned, "ACTIVITIES OF SOVIET TRAWLERS," IS-R, a copy of which was directed to subject's file.

The NYO has submitted a number of questions to be asked of the subject under their individual captions, ie;



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ACTIVITIES OF SOVIET TRAWLERS 8/18/72.

The NYO is in the process of selecting photographs of Soviet nationals who entered the US after 12/1/71 for submission to [redacted] in order to determine if the subject is able to identify them. It will be recalled that photographs of Soviets who were in the US prior to 12/1/71, have already been shown to the subject.

Ri

10
2 - Bureau (RM)
1 - NY

JB:jb
(3)

EX-114

REC-66

105-216642-82

23 SEP 8 1972

ESPIONAGE



5010-108

F246
54 SEP 22 1972

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI (105-216642)

DATE: 9/13/72

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (105-33352) (P)

SUBJECT: OLEG A. LYALIN
IS - R

Re Bureau routing slip, 8/4/72, enclosing
communication dated 7/31/72, wherein FBI comments
were solicited and WFO letter and LHM, 8/17/72.

Enclosed for the Bureau are five (5) copies
and for designated offices one (1) copy each of LHM
which is captioned, "GOLDFINCH."

The LHM is classified "~~SECRET~~" since it
contains information from [] so classified.

The Lithuanian group which is referred to
in the LHM was the subject of Bureau case entitled
"VISIT OF 39TH SOVIET TOURIST GROUP TO THE UNITED
STATES, 1960, IS - R."

Chicago recommends that the Bureau should
disseminate the enclosed LHM to [] to facilitate
further questioning of the source in an effort to identify
the individual who was given the KGB []

Chicago can suggest no questions which should
be put to the source regarding this matter in addition
to those submitted in re WFO LHM. Chicago will remain
alert in its file reviews for an individual meeting the
description of the individual in question.

- 2 - Bureau (Encs. 5) (RM)
1 - New York (INFO) (Enc. 1) (RM)
1 - San Francisco (INFO) (Enc. 1) (RM)
1 - WFO (105-106153) (INFO) (Enc. 1) (RM)
2 - Chicago
(1 - 105-8482)

LGA/bak
(7)

23 SEP 18 1972

ESPIONAGE



SEP 22 1972

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Chicago, Illinois
September 13, 1972

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

~~SECRET~~

~~GOLDFINCH~~

NO LOC

Reference is made to communication dated July 31, 1972, containing information regarding a visit to the United States of the Rector or Dean of the Klaipeda Branch of the Kaunas Polytechnic Institute. This individual, whose name could not be recalled by your source was described as a Lithuanian, who in 1961-62, visited the United States as a representative of the Intelligentsia in a Lithuanian delegation.

Research relative to Soviet groups visiting the United States resulted in locating only one group of individuals which could be characterized as a Lithuanian delegation composed of representatives of the Intelligentsia and which visited in the United States near the time recalled by the source. Groups meeting these two requirements are extremely rare, therefore, while not meeting the source information on all fours, further details are being submitted as worthy of consideration in achieving a solution to this matter.

The 39th Soviet tourist group to the United States consisted originally of 22 individuals who had made visa applications and where it was shown that 15 of this group were born in Lithuania. Only 12 of these persons, 10 of them born in Lithuania, actually arrived in the United States on December 15, 1960, to remain until December 29, 1960. These individuals are named below:

~~SECRET~~

~~Group 1~~

~~Excluded from Automatic
Downgrading and Declassification~~

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency; nor duplicated within your agency.

105-216642-86

ENCLOSURE

~~SECRET~~

RE: GOLDFINCH

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The approved itinerary of this group permitted them to spend four days in New York, New York, two days in Washington, D.C., two days in Chicago, Illinois, two days in Dearborn, Michigan, two days in the Buffalo-Niagara, New York area and two more days in New York before departing on return to the Soviet Union. Considering the tight schedule, and that the group was being escorted by American Express employees and accommodated in hotels, would seem to have precluded any member of the group from staying with any one family for a "long time." It is known, however, that members of this particular group were entertained by the pro-communist element of the Lithuanian emigre communities and also that they had an opportunity, and took advantage of same, to visit other individuals and families specifically in the Chicago Lithuanian

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

RE: GOLDFINCH

emigre community.

It is requested that the names of the 12 members of this Lithuanian delegation should be shown to the source in an effort to identify the individual who was given the Soviet Committee for States Security (KGB) [redacted] or possibly to facilitate his recollection regarding this situation.

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~~SECRET~~

105-216642-88 IN THIS FILE SKIPPED DURING
SERIALIZATION.

Cons / fr
10/11/72

✓

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI (105-216642)

DATE: 9/22/72

FROM : SAC, WFO (105-106153)

SUBJECT: OLEG A. LYALIN
IS - R

Re Bureau routing slip, 8/4/72 enclosing [redacted]
communication dated 7/31/72, wherein FBI comments were
solicited; WFOlet and LHM, 8/17/72, to the Bureau; CGlet
and LHM dated 9/13/72 to the Bureau.

Enclosed for the Bureau are five (5) copies and
for designated offices, one copy each of an LHM captioned
"GOLDFINCH" dated as above. Enclosed also for the Bureau
are photographs of eleven (11) members of the 39th Soviet
Tourist Group to visit the United States, 1960. A
photograph of the twelfth member, NINA IONOVNA SADAUSKAITE,
an Engineer, born 11/5/15, Leningradskaya Oblast, is not
available and does not appear to be pertinent.

The enclosed LHM has been classified "~~Secret~~"
inasmuch as it contains information furnished by [redacted]
and so classified.

WFO has reviewed its file captioned "Visit of the
39th Soviet Tourist Group to the United States, 1960, IS-R"
(WFO file 105-37324) which group was identified in referenced
Chicago letter as the vehicle used for his visit to the United
States by the Rector^{PR} Dean of the Klaipeda Branch of the Kaunas
Polytechnic Institute, known to the [redacted]

Regarding the twelve members of the group comprising
the 39th Soviet Tourist Group to visit the United States, 1960,
whose members were identified in referenced Chicago LHM, WFO
indices reflect that [redacted]

[redacted] Michigan, in December, 1960. [redacted]

2-Bureau (Enc 16)

- 1-New York (Enc 1) (Info)
- 1-San Francisco (Enc 1) (Info)
- 1-Chicago (105-33352) (Enc 1) (Info)
- 1-WFO

CAR:sld
(6)

53 OCT 6

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan



EX-116

SEP 26 1972

ESPIONAGE

2 Copy
by routing slip for
by info
date 10-4-72
by [redacted]

WFO & Photos

WFO 105-106153

[redacted] Tourist Group, previously arrived at New York International Airport, 11/12/59 in transit to Mexico, departing the U.S. on the same date. He re-entered the U.S. 12/30/59 in transit to Europe, again departing New York International Airport on the same date.

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b7C

WFO indices contain no additional pertinent information on other members of the 39th Soviet Tourist Group to visit the U.S., 1960.

WFO recommends that the Bureau disseminate the enclosed LHM and photographs to [redacted] for assistance in fulfilling the request contained in referenced Chicago LHM and to solicit additional information from [redacted] regarding their source's knowledge of [redacted] targets in the U S.

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Washington, D.C. 20535

September 22, 1972

~~SECRET~~

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

GOLDFINCH

Reference is made to communication of July 31, 1972, containing in part information about a visit to the United States by the Rector or Dean of the Klaipeda Branch of the Kaunas Polytechnic Institute. Reference also our communication of September 13, 1972, listing the identities of the twelve members of the 39th Soviet Tourist Group to visit the United States, 1960, which may have included the person known to your source as [REDACTED] b6 b7C b7D

One member of the 39th Soviet Tourist Group to visit the United States, in 1960, [REDACTED] Lithuania, [REDACTED] At that time, he lived in Klaipeda [REDACTED] [REDACTED] b6 b7C b7D

It is requested the enclosed photographs of eleven members of the 39th Soviet Tourist Group to visit the United States, 1960, be shown to your source in an effort to effect an identification. Any additional information your source may furnish about the several specific targets assigned to [REDACTED] in the United States, especially the identity of the Lithuanian family he visited for a long time, would also be appreciated. b6 b7C b7D

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~~SECRET~~
~~Group 1~~

Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification.

105-216642-11
ENCLOSURE

~~SECRET~~ (U)

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (105-118121)

SUBJECT: ACTIVITIES OF SOVIET TRAWLERS
IS-R

DATE: AUG 18 1972

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC
DECLASSIFICATION
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
EXEMPTION CODE: 50X(1 HUM)
DATE 07-16-2015
FBI INFORMATION ONLY
C32W33B91

Enclosed for the Bureau are seven copies of an LHM classified "~~Secret~~" as the information received from the [redacted] was so classified. Also enclosed are five copies of U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Marine Fisheries Service, Division of Enforcement and Surveillance reports. These reports are being supplied to the Bureau for observation and enlightenment and need not be returned to the NYO.

In January, 1972 [redacted]

New York Office indices are negative concerning [redacted]

After analyzing the information, the NYO under the direction of the SAC, Division III, established liaison with the Captain of the Port, US Coast Guard as well as the Chief Enforcement Officer and eventually with the Coast Guard Intelligence Unit which is located on Governors Island and directed by [redacted] With the permission of the SAC,

- ④ - Bureau (Encls. 12) (6RM)
 - ② - 105-216642 (LYALIN)
 - ① - 65-63234 (METHOD OF DETECTING SOVIET ILLEGAL AGENTS)
- 1 - New York (105-115626) (LYALIN)
- 1 - New York (65-17812) (METHOD OF DETECTING SOVIET ILLEGAL AGENTS)
- 1 - New York

RFM:dje
(7)

105-216642-
NOT RECORDED
45 AUG 22 1972

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

ENCLOSURE

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NY 105-118121

discussions were held with Captain of the Port as well as [redacted] and other subordinate officers in that all activities of an unnatural nature concerning Soviet trawlers be brought to the attention of the New York Office.

b6
b7C

In the early spring of this year, the Coast Guard initiated the dissemination of similar types of enclosed reports concerning the Soviet trawler fishing fleet.

Since the initiation of the liaison, the Coast Guard Intelligence Unit has been cooperative and alert to informing the NYO of any unusual or suspicious activities concerning any inquiries relative to the Soviet fishing fleet or any unusual activities. Thus far, however, this situation has been unproductive as to actually furnishing information which would at this time be of investigative value especially in relation to Soviet illegal operations in the US.

It is felt by the NYO that the Bureau at a headquarters liaison basis establish the exact responsibility of both the Navy and other agencies and whether any agency such as [redacted] is also involved in the monitoring of these ships. It is for this reason that an LHM is being prepared for further questioning of GOLDFINCH concerning the material he recently furnished.

b7E

The Bureau's attention is directed to communication on GOLDFINCH furnished on 7/13/72, and referenced Document PF 884, dated 6 July 1972, entitled "Collection of Information by the Use of Technical Devices, Listening and Recording Techniques." On page 5 #10 of referenced document, captioned "Use of Trawlers", the following is set forth:

Although the source was aware "of the use of the GRU boats mostly radio boats working amongst the Russian fishing fleets off the US coast all the time, he had not heard of such activities off Malin Head (North Island) which he understood was a favorite fishing area for Russian trawlers. In fact, he knew of no such activity round the UK, but would nevertheless expect it to be taking place. In US waters, the GRU boats did not fish properly, going round and round with the trawl. Unlike the genuine trawlers, they never approached the mother ship."

NY 105-118121

(S) The Bureau's attention is also directed to Bufile 105-87029 [redacted] NYairtel of 4/3/63, page 2 of information furnished [redacted] at that time of a conversation that source had with known GRU officers who were in the US at that time. It reported as follows

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b7C
b7Db1
b3

(S)

b6
b7C
b7Db1
b3

(S)

NY 105-118121

[REDACTED]

(S) b1
b3

[REDACTED]

b6
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[REDACTED]

(S) b1
b3

[REDACTED] an article which appeared in
"The New York Times" dated 4/10/63, reported as follows:

"Fishing Vessel Tells Navy
Submarine Entered Its Nets

"NEW BEDFORD, Mass., April 9 (UPI) - An unidentified submarine became entangled in the fishing nets of a New Bedford vessel late yesterday, it was reported today.

"Nelson Ostman, skipper of the 74-foot Sunapee, said he lost all his fishing gear overboard when the submarine went through his nets. He said the loss was about \$3,000.

"The crew said naval authorities had requested that they give no details of the accident at present. The Navy was investigating the incident."

In view of the foregoing, it is felt by the NYO that all offices having jurisdictional responsibilities on either coast where there are Soviet fishing trawlers be made aware of the information already in possession of the Bureau and establish liaison so that any activities performed by these vessels or any small vessels reported in the vicinity of these trawlers be reported to the Bureau so that the Bureau may properly analyze and investigate such situations which could be of value and aid in detecting either contact with or connection with a Soviet Illegal or Illegal network under the direct responsibility and jurisdiction of the Bureau.

NY 105-118121

The NYO after evaluating the material furnished by the Department of Commerce and their surveillance flights has not felt that it would be necessary to retain such material longer than a period of 90-180 days unless a significant fact was observed in one of the reports made available. It is felt that a review could be made at any time at the Department of Commerce which undoubtedly is held responsible for the retention of this information.

It is requested that the Bureau furnish [] with the LHM concerning the questions to be posed to LYALIN as answers to these questions would enlighten the Bureau concerning the use of trawlers and possibly supply information in an area which has received such little confirmation of the actual activities of these vessels. The information that LYALIN could supply would also clarify previous information furnished [] number of years ago. (S) []

b7D

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b3



In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
New York, New York

AUG 10 1972

Activities of Soviet Trawlers

On July 13, 1972, your service supplied us with information furnished by Goldfinch in your referenced communication PF 884 dated 6 July 1972, under the title "Collection of Information by the Use of Technical Devices, Listening and Recording Techniques." On page 5, number 10 of this report, Lyalin furnishes the following under the caption "Use of Trawlers":

Although the source was aware "of the use of the GRU boats mostly radio boats working amongst the Russian fishing fleets off the US coast all the time, he had not heard of such activities off Malin Head (North Island) which he understood was a favorite fishing area for Russian trawlers. In fact he knew of no such activity round the UK, but would nevertheless expect it to be taking place. In US waters the GRU boats did not fish properly, going round and round with the trawl. Unlike the genuine trawlers, they never approached the mother ship."

~~SECRET~~

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Declassification!

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OF THE FBI AND IS LOANED TO YOUR
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- 1* -

ENCLOSURE

105-216642-

~~SECRET~~

Activities of Soviet Trawlers

1. Does the source know of any information concerning the use of Soviet trawlers in connection with Illegal activities off either coast of the United States?
2. Had he ever heard of trawlers being used off the United States coast for communications with Illegal agents or networks in the United States?
3. Had he ever heard of an instance of the trawlers being used as vehicles of entry or exit of Illegals into or out of the United States?
4. Has he any knowledge of the GRU (Soviet Military Intelligence) monitoring officers' experience on these trawlers, including where if any of them had served in the United States?
5. Are these trawlers under the command of the Naval Intelligence arm of the GRU operating off United States waters or are they in any way controlled or directed by the GRU Resident, either legal or illegal in the United States?
6. Had he ever heard of the trawlers being actually called upon by the Illegals or the GRU Resident for assistance or for use in connection with observations or meets in near coastal waters of the United States?

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MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI (105-216642)

DATE: 11/17/72

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (105-33352) (RU)

SUBJECT: OLEG LYALIN
IS - R

Re Bureau routing slip, 7/10/72, captioned as
above enclosing [] memoranda dated 6/21/72, captioned
"G.N.T.K. (State Scientific and Technical Committee)."

[] submitted an analysis of information obtained
from various [] defectors
and members of United Kingdom trade delegations pointing up
the importance of the G.N.T.K. in business negotiations with
the West and KGB influence in these matters. The recipient
offices are requested to comment regarding whether any
similar experiences coming to their attention.

Chicago has afforded considerable thought to
this request, but has been unable to recall or to locate
within the recent past any situation which addresses itself
to the United Kingdom experience. If there is information
available from which a parallel can be drawn, it most likely
could be detected by closely examining the various facets of
Soviet negotiations with United States firms and/or trade
delegations immediately preceding the recent settlement of
major issues between the United States and the Soviet Union.
As a case in point, it is noted that negotiations between the
USSR and the International Harvester Corporation, Chicago,
which began in 1967, were only recently successfully completed
with the signing of a forty million dollar contract and perhaps
significantly, following closely on the heels of President
NIXON's trip to the Soviet Union. Chicago believes that a
study and analysis of these negotiations could produce
information bearing on the situation outlined by [] It
is known that the [] Domestic
Contacts Division at Chicago, had instituted such a study
but this office is unaware of the results of that effort.

- ② - Bureau (RM)
- 1 - New York (INFO) (RM)
- 1 - San Francisco (INFO) (RM)
- 1 - WFO (105-106153) (INFO) (RM)
- 1 - Chicago

REC-72

17 NOV 22 1972

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Chicago believes that a request for information of this nature could be handled more readily at a headquarters level where all pertinent material would be available for research&analysis. Investigation in the field which would normally develop this type of data is limited under Section 105G of the Manual of Instruction, and certain programmatic approaches in the DESECO area, in that members of trade delegations and U.S. firm negotiating teams which visit the USSR are normally treated as individuals who travel to the Soviet Union, and when they come to our attention, are only interviewed when they meet a specific criteria which rarely occurs. It would appear to be more desirable to meet with responsible leaders of such delegations and especially with appropriate officials of U.S. firms conducting negotiations with the Soviets both in the U.S. and the USSR so that these individuals could be alerted to Bureau interests and made sensitive to the subtleties of the KGB operating in various Soviet departments.

In view of the experience of [] and considering the increased trade and exchanges of technical representatives between U.S. and the USSR, it is felt that the Bureau representatives must become more active in developing contacts of the type described above. Further observations and recommendations in this regard will be the subject of a separate communication.

b7D

ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI (105-40818)

10/20/72

SAC, NEW YORK (105-14931) (C)



ReNYlet to Bureau, dated 8/2/72, and letter of
Legat, London, to Bureau, dated 9/27/72 which enclosed
letter of 9/26/72 from [redacted]
classified "~~Secret~~."

Inasmuch as the GOLDENCH source confirmed the
[redacted] the Bureau may
wish to bring this data to the attention of the USDS, in
the event subject attempts to enter the US to assume a post
within the Soviet Consulate - San Francisco.

- 4 - Bureau (RM)
 - (1 - 105-210032) (SOVIET CONSUL GENERAL - SAN FRANCISCO)
 - (1 - 105-216642) (LYALIN)
- 1 - San Francisco (105-16284) (SOVIET CONSUL GENERAL - SAN FRANCISCO) (INFO) (RM)
- 1 - New York (105-112777) (SOVIET CONSUL GENERAL - SAN FRANCISCO)
- 1 - New York

6 OCT 25 1972
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105-216642-

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ORIGINAL FILED IN

MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI (105-216642) DATE: 11/20/72

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (105-115626)

SUBJECT: OLEG A. LYALIN
IS-R

Re New York letter, 9/5/72.

Enclosed herewith are five copies of an LHM captioned
"Soviet State Scientific and Technical Committee (G.N.T.K.)/
Goldfinch" dated as above.

The enclosed LHM is classified "Secret" as the inquiry
made by [] was so classified.

Certain of the information set forth in enclosed LHM was
furnished by [] So as to further protect this source
no date was mentioned and the information was set forth in general
terms.


- 3 - Bureau (Enc. 5) (RM)
(1 - Legat, London) — Not Sent
1 - New York

JB/jtk
(4)

EX-117

REC-67

105-216642-96



DEC 13 1972

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

New York, New York
November 20, 1972

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

~~SECRET~~

~~Soviet State Scientific and Technical
Committee (G.N.T.K.) Goldfinch~~ 116

Reference is made to memorandum "Np. 0832, 21 June 1972" which forwarded to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) a note relating to the apparent role being played by captioned organization in trade negotiations with the United Kingdom.

While there is no direct evidence of a G.N.T.K. role being played in the current negotiations leading to a general trade agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States, the [redacted] have always utilized the Soviet trading agency in the United States, the Amtorg Trading Corporation in New York City, to provide cover positions for officers and agents of the Scientific and Technical Directorates of the [redacted]. Such individuals are currently involved in negotiations with numerous American business firms for the purchase of technology and equipment.

b7D

In addition, indications have been received to the effect that [redacted] Scientific and Technical Directorates would be accompanying many of the Soviet trade groups expected to be visiting the United States within the next few months as a result of the trade agreement negotiations.

b7D

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY [redacted]
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY I
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON INDEFINITE

(U)

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b7C

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1 105-21660-96

~~SECRET~~

Soviet State Scientific and Technical
Committee (G.N.T.K.)/Goldfinch

It is recognized that the expulsion of []
from the United Kingdom in September, 1971, created a special
condition there for the [] It is to be expected that the
[] would utilize all available opportunities to re-establish
their position in the United Kingdom and the apparent use of
the G.N.T.K. in Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade negotiations
presents one such opportunity.

b7D

~~SECRET~~

- 2* -

MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI (105-216642) DATE: 11/22/72

FROM : *JPL/jtk* SAC, NEW YORK (105-115626)

SUBJECT: OLEG A. LYALIN
IS-R

Re New York letter, 9/5/72.

Enclosed herewith are five copies of an LHM dated as above and captioned, "GOLDFINCH", and photographs of 131 Soviets who have been assigned in the New York area since 11/1/71. *31*

The enclosed LHM is classified "~~Secret~~" as ☐ has so classified all correspondence in this matter as such and in that the unauthorized disclosure of the information contained therein could reasonably be expected to result in serious damage to the national security. *b7D*

The names listed in enclosed LHM were taken from the "Soviet Administrative List" dated 10/1/72. The only names which were not included were those few where suitable photographs are not yet available. Those Soviets who arrived for the UNGA were not included. *b7D*

ST-111

REC-73

3 - Bureau (Enc. 136) (RM)
(1 - Legat, London)
1 - New York

JB/jtk
(4)

Partly sealed
ENCLOSURE

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ESPIONAGE

5 DEC 11 1972



5010-108

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan



In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
New York, New York
November 22, 1972


~~SECRET~~

Goldfinch

There follows a list of Soviet nationals who have been assigned in the New York City area since November 1, 1971. There are enclosed 131 photographs of these Soviets which are numbered on the reverse side to correspond with this list.

It is requested that these photographs be shown to the Goldfinch subject for his comments with regard to any [redacted] connection.

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CLASSIFIED BY [redacted]
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY I
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON INDEFINITE

b6
b7C


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ENCLOSURE

105-216642-98

~~SECRET~~

Goldfinch




b6
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~~SECRET~~

Goldfinch




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b7D

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Goldfinch



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~~SECRET~~

- 4* -